1. Tragedy of the Commons
- Collective action problem
Rational individual behavior can create irrational collective outcomes. Each actor has weak incentive to self-limit when costs are shared.
Counter-frame: Coordination, rules, and incentive alignment. Not moral shaming alone.
2. Incentive Mismatch
- Structural diagnosis
Actors may sincerely state a public goal while incentives reward behavior that undermines it.
Counter-frame: Ask what behavior is actually rewarded.
3. Diffusion of Responsibility
- Common in distributed harms
When responsibility is spread across many actors, each person treats contribution as negligible and no one acts.
Counter-frame: Combine participation rates with institutional policy levers.
~*~ HOW THIS CONNECTS TO FALLACIES ~*~
| Causal Driver | Typical Fallacy Links | Detection Tell |
|---|---|---|
| Tragedy of the Commons | Non Sequitur, Special Pleading, Zero-Sum | "If everyone won't do it, doing it is foolish." |
| Incentive Mismatch | Smuggled Philosophy, Appeal to Emotion | Stated goal diverges from highest-impact actions. |
| Diffusion of Responsibility | Ignoratio Elenchi, Tu Quoque | "My part is too small to matter." |
> GetCausalDriver("Tragedy of the Commons")
> ListCausalDrivers()
> ApplyConsistencyTest("Any one person lowering CO2 is a fool.")